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AND SARA ROSENBAUM, JD
P rograms to rate, grade, rank, or tier physiciansbased on quality or other measures are becomingmore commonplace as the demand for greater
transparency and accountability in the nation’s health
care system intensifies. For many years, the preferred
provider organization (PPO) reflected the most basic
form of tiering—physicians were either included or ex-
cluded from the PPO network. However, this approach
has become more refined as the tools for evaluating
physician performance have evolved.
Once in a network or practice area, physicians may
be rated in a variety of ways by health plans, payers,
hospitals, and other entities that have some control over
the physician’s practice or payment. Rating may be
used to reward high quality care and exclude, or steer
patients away from, poor performers. In more and more
communities and settings, mechanisms to evaluate and
differentiate among physicians are under development
as a way to promote clinical and economic value in
health care expenditures, as the focus moves from
solely expanding access to health care services to im-
proving the purchasing of those services by consumers
and payers. This trend reflects studies showing major
deficits in health care quality.1
As health plans and other entities have begun to pub-
licly report information about the physician quality and
cost efficiency, physicians have expressed concern
about the accuracy of the public information and the
methods that are used to create this information. In or-
der to safeguard the interests of both patients and phy-
sicians, government representatives have moved to
regulate the rating of physicians and the public report-
ing of those ratings.
For instance, a physician rating system in Washing-
ton State prompted a lawsuit alleging defamation of
physicians and violation of consumer protection laws as
a result of the publication of inaccurate information.2 In
New York, the Attorney General conducted an industry-
wide inquiry into physician rating by health plans and
developed the New York Doctor Ranking Model Code,
1 Elizabeth McGlynn, et. al., The Quality of Health Care De-
livered to Adults in the United States, The New England Jour-
nal of Medicine, 348, pp. 2635-2645.
2 Washington State Medical Assoc. v. Regence BlueShield,
No. 06-2-30665-1SEA, Seattle WA Superior Court (filed Nov.
29, 2006).
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which eight insurance companies have agreed to fol-
low.3 The New York Attorney General has followed a
practice of sending letters to insurance companies that
engage in physician ranking, warning that the rankings
might violate New York consumer protection laws. Af-
ter discussions and negotiations between the Attorney
General and the targeted companies, the agreements
that emerged are essentially settlements in which the
company promises to follow certain procedures de-
signed to ensure fairness and accuracy in the rating
process. Companies also agree to be subject to the over-
sight of the state Ratings Examiner.4 Since the state’s
initial agreement with CIGNA HealthCare, several
other health plans have entered into similar agree-
ments. At the same time, there have been efforts to de-
velop processes prospectively for collecting and report-
ing quality data in a way that ensures accuracy and fair-
ness while providing patients with useful information to
make better health care decisions. An example of such
a consensus agreement is the ‘‘Patient Charter for Phy-
sician Performance Measurement, Reporting and Tier-
ing Programs,’’ which is a voluntary set of principles for
such programs that was endorsed by consumer, em-
ployer, and labor groups.5
Other states have taken a similar interest in how phy-
sician rating programs are developed. Citing the poten-
tial for unfair or inaccurate physician profiling, as well
as the need for greater transparency of information
about health care quality and costs, in 2008 Colorado
enacted a law requiring minimum standards and spe-
cific procedures for health plan physician rating sys-
tems.6 While the New York agreements and the Patient
Charter apply only to those health plans that agree to
abide by their terms, Colorado’s law establishes proce-
dures that must be followed by every health plan in the
state. Similar legislation was introduced in the Okla-
homa legislature in 2008 and in Maryland and Texas
legislatures in February 2009. Thus, the potential for
legislation affecting efforts to advance public reporting
of physician quality measures is an increasing area of
concern.
These developments reflect a longstanding tradition
of laws aimed at protecting the interests of physicians
in systems that involve performance evaluation. For ex-
ample, the federal Health Care Quality Improvement
Act (HCQIA)7 is aimed at creating a fair process for
hospital peer review determinations involving physician
admitting privileges. Similarly, common law principles
have been applied to decisions by health insurers to
deny physicians membership in, or exclude them from,
plan networks. In this sense, fair process laws related to
physician ratings have a long history and considerable
precedent.
Colorado’s Physician Designation Disclosure
Act
The Physician Designation Disclosure Act was signed
into law on June 3, 2008, and took effect on Sept. 1,
2008.8 The law addresses four key issues: data integrity;
disclosure; fair process; and enforcement.
The law requires health plans to follow specific pro-
cedures and consider certain factors in designing any
system for rating physicians. Specifically, it requires
that any public representation of a physician’s perfor-
mance (such as a grade or tier) include a quality of care
component and use statistically accurate and adjusted
data that are appropriately attributed to the physician.9
Any practice guidelines or performance measures used
must be endorsed by National Quality Forum or a simi-
lar organization, a national physician specialty organi-
zation, or the Colorado Clinical Guidelines Collabora-
tive.10 The guidelines or measures must be evidence-
based (whenever possible), consensus-based (whenever
possible), and pertinent to the area of practice, location,
and characteristics of the physicians’ patient popula-
tion.11 The rating or designation must be accompanied
by a disclaimer noting the risk of error and advising pa-
tients not to use the rating as the sole factor in choosing
a physician.12 Using a physician designation without
this disclaimer is a violation of the law.13
In addition, the Colorado law gives physicians certain
rights to information, notice, and due process as part of
the mandatory procedures that health plans must fol-
low with regard to any rating or designation system
they intend to use. For instance, upon request, the
health plan14 must disclose to the physician its rating
methodology and all data upon which the designation
was based.15 If contractual obligations prevent the dis-
closure of certain data, the health plan must provide the
physician with enough information to determine how
the withheld data affected the designation.
At least 45 days before using the designation, the
health plan must give the physician notice of the desig-
nation and procedures for obtaining the information on
which the designation was based and requesting an ap-
peal of the designation decision.16 The health plan’s no-
tice and appeal procedures must give the physician an
opportunity to submit or have considered corrected
data, to have the applicability of the methodology con-
sidered, to be assisted by a representative, and to have
the designation decision explained by the person(s) re-
sponsible for it.17 The appeal must be made to someone
with the authority to modify the designation decision
and to ensure that the designation is fair, reasonable,
and accurate, and their decision must be made in writ-
3 Office of the Attorney General, Doctor Ranking Programs,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/health_care/
HIT2/doctor_ranking.html.
4 Office of the Attorney General, Press Release: Attorney
General Cuomo Announces Agreement with Cigna Creating a
New National Model for Doctor Ranking Programs (Oct. 29,
2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/
2007/oct/oct29a_07.html.
5 The Patient Charter (an initiative of the Consumer Pur-
chaser Disclosure Project) is available at http://
healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/files/
PatientCharterDisclosureRelease040108.pdf.
6 Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.).§ 25-38-102.
7 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et. seq.
8 Physician Designation Disclosure Act, Senate Bill 08-138
(Colorado General Assembly, 2d Sess. 2008). Available at
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/sl2008a/sl_403.htm
(accessed Feb. 28, 2008).
9 C.R.S. § 25-38-104(1)
10 C.R.S. § 25-38-104(1)(f)(I).
11 C.R.S. § 25-38-104(1)(f)(II).
12 C.R.S. § 25-38-104(2)(a).
13 C.R.S. § 25-38-104(2)(b).
14 The law uses the term ‘‘health care entity,’’ which is de-
fined as any carrier or other entity that provides a plan of
health care coverage to beneficiaries.
15 C.R.S. § 25-38-105(1).
16 C.R.S. § 25-38-106(1).
17 C.R.S. § 25-38-106(2).
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ing. The designation cannot be used until the appeal is
completed, which should be within 45 days, and any
necessary changes to a previously public designation
must be made within 30 days after the appeal is final.18
An important procedural feature of the law is that all
data submitted by a physician to the entity ‘‘shall be
presumed valid and accurate.’’ This means that the bur-
den is on the health plan to disprove the physician’s
data; if the physician submits corrected or supplemen-
tal data on appeal, the entity must presume that the new
data are valid and accurate. At the same time, the law
requires that a plan ensure the use of accurate data in
its designation. Although the law prescribes certain
procedures to help ensure accuracy, such as a method
for determining measurement accuracy and the use of
performance measures that are considered valid and re-
liable, it does not address how conflicting data should
be reconciled. In short, it is not clear how the health
plan should satisfy its obligation to ensure accuracy in
the face of a presumption of accuracy for physician
data, whether the data are submitted initially or on ap-
peal.
In addition to providing for governmental oversight,
the law specifically affords physicians a private right of
action to enforce its provisions in a civil action. The law
also makes all remedies available, including monetary
damages and injunctive relief, such as an order prevent-
ing publication of the rating.19 That means that physi-
cians who allege harm as a result of a health plan’s vio-
lation of the law can sue the health plan. Health plans
are prohibited from limiting physician’s enforcement
rights, including through the use of contractual clauses
waiving such rights.20 A violation of the law by a health
plan is deemed an unfair or deceptive practice in viola-
tion of Colorado’s insurance code, which means that, in
addition to the other privately enforced civil remedies
described above, the state insurance commissioner can
assess penalties and order the health plan to cease un-
lawful practices.21
Other Laws Requiring Fair Process for
Physicians
Constitutional Protections
If the entity making a ranking decision is a state ac-
tor, such as a publicly-owned hospital or a state licens-
ing board, then constitutional due process requirements
may also apply. Due process usually requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard and the right to present evi-
dence in an impartial forum.22
Federal and State Statutes
Although the idea of rating physicians for public re-
porting purposes is part of a recent emphasis on ‘‘value-
based purchasing’’ by ‘‘health care consumers,’’ the
ranking of physicians in ways that may affect their live-
lihoods has created legal disputes for decades. Legal
disputes arose out of actions such as exclusion of phy-
sicians from networks, participation in managed care
plans, and designation of physicians as ‘‘preferred pro-
viders.’’ Out of concern for consumer choice and access
to providers, many states have enacted ‘‘any willing
provider’’ laws that require health insurers to allow any
provider willing to accept the insurer’s financial and
other contractual terms to participate in that insurer’s
health plan.23 These laws ensure fairness in the selec-
tion process by guaranteeing that providers will not be
arbitrarily excluded.
The granting or removal of hospital privileges or
membership in a group practice or professional society
are other examples of quality-based judgments that af-
fect a physician’s ability to make a living. Such judg-
ments are often the end result of a ‘‘peer review’’ pro-
cess in which physicians are judged by other physi-
cians. Many states have laws that impose procedural
requirements on entities making these sorts of deci-
sions in order to protect physicians’ livelihoods while
encouraging high-quality health care for patients.
In addition, the federal Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act (HCQIA)24 sets minimum procedural stan-
dards by granting limited immunity from damages to
physicians who participate in peer review actions (i.e.,
actions that review a physician’s competence and may
adversely affect clinical privileges or membership in a
professional society), as long as the action meets cer-
tain standards of fairness. HCQIA specifies ‘‘safe har-
bor’’ procedures that will satisfy the Act’s notice and
appeal requirements.25 The HCQIA conditions its im-
munity provisions on certain conduct; for peer-review
participants to be protected, the action ‘‘must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in fur-
therance of quality health care, (2) after a reasonable
effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after ad-
equate notice and hearing procedures [or other fair pro-
cedures] are afforded to the physician involved, and (4)
in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted
by the facts known after [reasonable effort].’’26 Peer re-
view action is presumed to meet this standard but may
be reviewed by a court for objective reasonableness.27
Common Law
Courts have implied state and federal common law
duties of fair process or fair procedure in cases involv-
ing physician hospital privileges or physician participa-
tion in health insurance networks.28 The duty of fair
process arises from the general notion that private con-
tracts may not contravene the public interest.29 In a re-
cent case, a California court of appeal applied this doc-
trine to the exclusion of a medical group from an insur-
er’s preferred provider network.30 The court explained
that the doctrine of fair procedure applied to decisions
that affected the public interest, particularly when there
18 C.R.S. § 25-38-106(2)-(4).
19 C.R.S. § 25-38-107(2).
20 C.R.S. § 25-38-107(1).
21 C.R.S. § 25-38-107(3)
22 E.g., Carlini v. Highmark, 756 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1999).
23 Currently, 21 states have some kind of ‘‘any willing pro-
vider’’ law. http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/AWP.htm.
24 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1112.
26 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a).
27 Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, 537 F. 3d 368 (5th Cir.
2008).
28 E.g., Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153
(Cal. 2000).
29 ‘‘The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an
example of a common law application of public policy to con-
tract law.’’ Harper v. Healthsource N.H., 674 A.2d 962, 965
(N.H. 1996).
30 Palm Medical Group, Inc. v. State Compensation Insur-
ance Fund, 161 Cal. App. 4th 206 (2008).
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were substantial economic ramifications.31 In such
cases, the doctrine required that the decision be both
‘‘substantively rational’’ (i.e., not arbitrary, capricious,
discriminatory, irrational, or contrary to public policy)
and ‘‘procedurally fair’’ (i.e., after notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard).32
Discussion
In two respects the Colorado law appears to go be-
yond where the HCQIA, common law principles, or
state statutory ‘‘any willing provider laws’’ go. First, the
Colorado law appears to permit physicians to sue to re-
cover damages in the event of error, even where the
process is fair. Second, unlike common law situations,
the Colorado statute appears to create a presumption in
favor of physician-submitted data as part of the fair pro-
cess itself. The extent to which these differences may
have a chilling effect on the development of physician
rating systems in Colorado cannot yet be known.
Unlike the Colorado statute for example, the HCQIA
does not give private physicians a private right of action
to sue for damages flowing from an incorrect decision;
indeed, the act is designed to provide a defense for the
decision-makers in the event of such an action, insulat-
ing them from liability for incorrect decisions as long as
the process was fair. Thus, were a physician who had
received a fair process review under the HCQIA to sue
for injury under one or more theories (e.g., tortious in-
terference with a livelihood, defamation, or some other
ground), the defendants would be protected if their
decision-making process was fair. In this regard, the
HCQIA is in a sense the mirror image of the Colorado
law. Unlike the Colorado law, the HCQIA places the
emphasis on fair process, while the Colorado law ap-
pears to expose even a fair process to private suit if the
outcome is erroneous.
A key factor that may help explain the difference be-
tween the balancing of interests in the Colorado law
and the HCQIA is that the former involves a decision by
a health insurer, while the latter involves peer review.
But the Colorado statute also appears to extend beyond
common law, other state-designed efforts such as that
undertaken in New York State, and state statutory prin-
ciples applicable to network membership and exclu-
sion, which all also involve actions by insurers rather
than peers. The Colorado law is unique in how it strikes
the balance between protecting the interests of physi-
cians and encouraging the use of quality measurement
systems. In Colorado’s case, fair process provides no
shield against private actions for damages arising from
errors in measurement. How this balance of interests
will affect future decisions to use ratings systems is a
matter that bears close scrutiny.
Colorado’s law is unique even as to its process provi-
sions. Taken together, the laws discussed above reflect
a general requirement that certain types of decisions af-
fecting a physician’s livelihood, similar to physician
ranking decisions, be reasonable and that the provider
receive adequate notice and opportunity for a fair hear-
ing. The Colorado physician profiling law includes
these requirements but goes further in protecting phy-
sicians by prescribing standards for the rating decision,
specific procedures that must be followed both before
and after the rating decision, and a presumption of cor-
rectness on the part of physician-supplied information,
and imposes conditions on the publication of the rating.
Historically, fair process laws have favored health care
entities making a judgment about physician perfor-
mance, effectively placing general safety and quality
concerns over the specific interests of any particular
physician. The Colorado law departs from that tradi-
tion, shifting the burden of proving the accuracy of data
to the health plan making the designation decision.
In addition the Colorado law breaks new ground by
giving individual physicians a right to sue for any viola-
tion of the law. The law also makes any violation of its
terms a violation of the state insurance code, giving the
state the right to sue to enforce it. Some advocates of
public disclosure are concerned that the burden on
health plans to comply with the extensive and detailed
procedural requirements in the Colorado law, com-
bined with the enhanced liability it imposes for even in-
advertent failures to meet these requirements, will have
a chilling effect on efforts to publish quality information
about physicians for the benefit of consumers and pay-
ers.
It is important to note that the Colorado law applies
only to health insurers or entities that offer health plans
and do not appear to apply to an independent rating
system that secures data from insurers. At the same
time, insurers and plans may hesitate to furnish such
data out of underlying liability concerns, since the pro-
vision of data to a third party could be interpreted as an
effort to avoid application of the law by using a business
associate, and may be less willing to collect the data
from providers.
It is also unclear how state laws such as Colorado’s
will interact with new federal legislation that will re-
quire some level of provider performance measurement
in Medicare.33 CMS indicated that ‘‘public reporting
will play a key role’’ in the physician value-based pur-
chasing plan it is developing.34 This federal initiative
could result in performance measurement and public
reporting procedures that, while not preemptive, could
be very different from the procedures used by private
insurers. These differences could frustrate efforts to
move to the CMS-designed system for all payers or in-
crease resistance to the development of different proce-
dures by states or individual insurers.
In the meantime, organizations working on physician
performance measurement and public reporting of
quality data will have to navigate this changing environ-
ment carefully. The most prudent course of action
would appear to be to work in partnership with physi-
cians to win support for their performance measure-
ment efforts and to inform lawmakers about the value
of these collaborative efforts.
31 Id. at 215.
32 Id. at 222.
33 Medicare Improvement for Patients and Providers Act of
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